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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 96 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 29/05/1997 




Primary cause: Inadequate survey (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Detection accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  






Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
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inadequate equipment (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for two years. It was ten days since he last attended a revision 
course and 34 days since his last leave. The ground in the area was described as a garden 
with trees and bushes, medium hard. A photograph showed the accident site close to a wall 
with a confusion of red stones near the hole left by the blast. The device was identified as an 
electrically booby trapped PMN ("found fragments") similar to another defused device found 
at the same site. [The original report said it was a booby trapped grenade.] A photograph of a 
similar booby trap device that was defused was unclear, but seemed to show a battery and 
condenser. 
The investigators determined that the victim was checking the boundary land and got a 
reading with his detector and investigated it with his prodder. He prodded in the squatting 
position but found nothing. As he stood up to recheck the position with his detector the device 
went off in front of him. 
The Sub-Commander said that the victim was working properly and the accident was the 
result of the unexpected booby trap. He said that such areas should be cleared with a back-
hoe. 
The Section Leader said that the victim was prodding and was careless. He stated that new 
equipment for these areas would make clearance safer. 
The victim's partner said he was working properly and the accident was caused by the 




The investigators concluded that the victim was checking the safety lane and ignored proper 
marking and safety procedures. He had received a reading over a long stretch of ground 
because of the buried wires and so was unable to centralise a reading: as a result he did not 
mark, but simply started to prod. The device was booby trapped and the pressure of the 
deminer's weight on the plastic pipe with wires inside caused the detonation when he stood 
up. In their opinion, the accident could have been avoided if the victim had  "observed 
technical/prodding and marking procedures". 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the issue of a mine missed in a safety lane should be 
investigated with the survey teams; that deminers should be reminded that every reading is a 
potential mine; that when there is a risk of booby traps, the command group should ensure 
"proper and strict" safety precautions; and that survey teams should ensure that 99.6% of all 
devices are cleared from boundary lanes, and should make every effort to provide accurate 
information about the kind of devices in the mined area. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 128 Name: [Name removed] 
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Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: 400,000 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 







See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as: minor injuries to legs and right hand.  
A medic's sketch showed abrasions to his lower left leg and right forearm and lacerations to 
his right thigh.  
A photograph showed minor injuries to the inside of his right thigh and lower left leg. 
The demining group reported that the victim had suffered linear fracture of his left tibia and 
loss of hearing in his left ear. On 27th May 1997 they added that he had lost his hearing "near 
totally" and could not be re-employed as a deminer. The injuries were described later as: 
fractured left tibia, hearing loss in left ear, multiple superficial injuries, and a dislocated left 
ankle. He claimed a total hearing loss in his left ear and partial in his right. No other serious 
disability remained on 30th July 1997 when he was assessed by a medical surgeon and his 
hearing loss was assessed as 75%.  
Compensation was forwarded on 28th October 1997 for 400,000 Rs (80% disability). 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Inadequate survey" because the "boundary" 
lane was supposed to have been cleared during survey. It seems likely that the device was 
missed by the survey team marking the boundary lanes, and that represents a serious failing 
elsewhere in the management chain. The secondary cause is listed as a 
“Management/control inadequacy”. 
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing. 
The victim’s severe deafness is common among Afghan claims at this time, when insurance 
favoured such injury and testing the validity of claims was difficult. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
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was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
 
Related papers 
The UN MAC issued a letter stating that Section Leaders should keep better control and 
enforce correct procedures and that disciplinary action should be taken against deminers who 
disobey their Team and Section Leaders. It also stated that a “missed device investigation” 
would be started [not made available].  
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